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THE LAW OF WAR AND ITS PATHOLOGIES
George P. Fletcher*
War is with us more than ever. This is true despite the efforts
of the United Nations Charter to ban the concept of war from the
vocabulary of its member states.' The preferred term is armed
conflict. True, the Charter does refer to the Second World War, but
apart from this concession to historically entrenched labels, the W
word appears only once-when the Charter refers to ridding the
world of the scourge of war.2 The Geneva Conventions, adopted a few
years later, follow the same pattern.' George Orwell could not be
more amused. We change the vocabulary and think we have changed
the world.
The Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute even tried to
out-Orwell Orwell.4  They coined the term "international
humanitarian law" to refer to the new law of war.' Nothing could be
Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law.
Submitted as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.
Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 53979.
1. U.N. Charter.
2. U.N. Charter pmbl.
3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter First Geneva
Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Second Geneva
Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950)
[hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].
4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature
July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome
Statute].
5. See generally Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on the
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more deceptive than referring to the Rome Statute, which establishes
severe punishments for crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity, as a humanitarian measure.6 There is nothing
humanitarian about sending men and women to jail for committing
egregious crimes. Retributive punishment and its conceptual
neighbor vengeance are alive and well in all of our international
institutions, but lawyers still think of themselves as humanitarian
benefactors of the just and good.
Of course, the Geneva Conventions have a humanitarian
purpose of protecting the sick, civilians, and prisoners of war (POWs)
from the sometimes-indiscriminate dangers of military hostilities.7
But criminal law also has the general purpose of protecting innocent
people from harmful criminal behavior. If institutions are properly
called humanitarian by virtue of their good purposes, then we might
as well call the entire system of criminal law, including the death
penalty, domestic humanitarian law.
Language is losing its moorings and we have to ask why. We
refer to invasion of Iraq as self-defense.8 POWs are now called
"enemy combatants" and are subject to detention under national
Additional Protocols of June 8, 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949
XXVII (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) (commenting on the Conventions'
establishment of the term "international humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflict" to mean law that is established by treaties or custom and intended to
solve humanitarian problems arising from international or non-international
armed conflicts); see also Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 36(3)(b)(ii) (referring to
"international humanitarian law" as distinct from the "law of human rights"). Cf
Dietrich Schindler, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationship of
the Laws, 31 Am. U. L. Rev. 935, 935 (1982) (noting that the International
Committee of the Red Cross introduced the term in reference to the Geneva
Conventions).
6. Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 6-8.
7. First Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 3.1 (addressing the wounded
and the sick members of the armed forces in the field); Second Geneva
Convention, supra note 3, art. 3.1 (addressing the wounded, sick, and
shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea); Third Geneva Convention,
supra note 3, art. 3.1 (addressing prisoners of war); Fourth Geneva Convention,
supra note 3, art. 3.1 (addressing civilians).
8. See President George W. Bush, Remarks Calling on Saddam Hussein to
Leave Iraq (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html; W. Michael Reisman & Andrea
Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 Am.
J. Int'l L. 525 (2006).
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rather than international law.9 Who are we kidding and why the
charade? Perhaps conflicts in the post-9/11 period are so conceptually
difficult for us that we hide in mellow-sounding words to avoid the
hard conceptual work that the times require.
I want to suggest three core conceptual problems that we do
in fact systematically avoid, whatever the reason may be. I will make
provocative suggestions in the hope that others will join the
conversation and make progress where I have fallen short.
The first major problem is the distinction between war and
crime and why it matters.'0 The second is the problem of protecting
civilian life in warfare. And the third is the merger of war and crime
in the concepts of war crimes and criminal liability of "enemy
combatants."
All three of these problems interweave in the analysis of
targeted assassinations. The first question is whether the killing of
suspected terrorists, say by the Israeli Defense Force in the West
Bank or in Gaza, should be governed by the model of fighting crime
or the model of conducting warfare. The second problem is the
protection of innocent civilian bystanders and how a principle of
protection would be affected by treating the act resulting in harm
either as self-defense against criminal aggression or as military
action against a hostile enemy. The third issue is the classification of
the terrorists themselves. Are they to be treated as POWs exempt
from criminal liability, as "enemy combatants" subject to criminal
liability, or civilians protected against the ravages of war? The Israeli
Supreme Court addressed all three of these interrelated problems in
its long-awaited decision of December 14, 2006, regarding targeted
assassinations. "
At first blush there does not seem to be much of a
9. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a (West 2007).
10. There is not much literature on this problem. David Kretzmer has an
influential article distinguishing between war and the law enforcement model.
See David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial
Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 Eur. J. Int'l L. 171 (2005); see also
Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 457
(2002) (discussing whether the United States should employ a conceptual
framework of crime or war in combating terrorism).
11. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Gov't of Israel [2006],
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf (holding that
targeted assassinations are legitimate under Article 51(3) of the First Geneva
Protocol, accepted in Israel as customary international law).
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relationship between the Israeli Supreme Court case and another
critical decision of 2006, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,12 which considered the
jurisdiction of military tribunals under the law of war. The burden of
my article is to show how these critical decisions stem from the same
conceptual confusions about the implications of war and the use of
military power.
I. WAR AND CRIME
At the moment of the first major attack on the continental
United States in almost two centuries, the September 11, 2001
attacks, we were confused about the right terms and analogies to
describe what had happened. Was it a crime calling for justice, or an
attack calling for a declaration of war? Was it an aggravated case of
the Oklahoma City bombing or a recurrence of Pearl Harbor? If the
attacks were the crimes of individuals-Islamic fundamentalist
versions of Timothy McVeigh-then we could think about arresting
the culprits and bringing them to "justice." If the attacks began a war
with international terrorists, wherever they were, then justice was
irrelevant. The primary value would be self-defense. In order to
defend ourselves, we should have been prepared to strike at the
enemy by any means possible-including military invasions, targeted
assassinations, and even the use of military tribunals as an
instrument of warfare.
In 2001 the Bush administration was ambivalent about
whether it wanted justice or war. The Pentagon initially labeled the
military campaign Infinite Justice, 13 but at the same time President
Bush described the attack as an act of war.
14
Not much has changed since then. The President's October
2006 speech'5 announcing his signature of the Military Commission
12. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
13. See Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army, Meeting with Pentagon
Reporters (Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/
Transcript.aspx?TranscriptlD=1905.
14. President George W. Bush, Remarks After Meeting with National
Security Team (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html ("The deliberate and deadly attacks
which were carried out yesterday ... were acts of war.").
15. President George W. Bush, Speech Announcing Signature of Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (Oct. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061017-1.html.
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Act of 200616 (MCA) indicates that he persists in thinking of our
response to the September 11, 2001 attacks as both a fight against
criminals whom we must bring to justice and a fight against warriors
whom we must kill in military operations. The MCA unites the two
concepts: it defines the punishment of crimes at the same time that it
represents itself as a military measure against enemy forces.' 7
We should be clear about the differences between the pursuit
of justice and the execution of war. In matters of justice, we should be
focused on the individual culprits. In matters of war, the individual
culprits are beside the point. War is waged against a collective,
typically a nation-state. No one cared about the individual Japanese
pilots who returned safely from the attack on Pearl Harbor. They
were not criminals but rather agents of an enemy power. They were
not personally "guilty" of the attack, nor were their commanders, who
acted in the name of the Japanese nation.
Justice in punishment leads to the common understanding of
the Biblical maxim of an eye for an eye: if we lost 3,000 people, then
they should too. But suppose that the entire infrastructure of the
terrorist movement suddenly surrendered. Or suppose its members
credibly pledged never to attack again. Would we have justification
for harming a single soul? Yes, in the pursuit of justice. No, in
waging war. This shows that the aims of war can be more merciful
than the imperatives of seeking moral order.
Even if we desired justice, we are not in a position to pursue
it. We are a party to the dispute, not a neutral judge above the fray.
We cannot be both a combatant and the jury of our own rectitude.
This is the reason that Immanuel Kant concluded that punitive wars
were logically impossible. 18 Punishment presupposes hierarchal
16. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). The MCA authorizes
the President to establish military tribunals and set procedures governing their
use "to try alien unlawful enemy combatants engaged in hostilities against the
United States for violations of the law of war and other offenses triable by
military commision." 10 U.S.C.A. § 948b(a) (West 2007); see also George P.
Fletcher, Hamdan Confronts the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 45 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 427 (2007) (analyzing the MCA against the background of current
Supreme Court precedents).
17. See also Fletcher, supra note 16, at 433-40 (discussing the dubious
constitutional status of the commission).
18. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 117 (Mary Gregor ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
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authority: the state can punish its citizens, parents can punish their
children, and God can punish humanity; in all of these cases, the
punishing agent has authority to condemn the offender and impose
sanctions by force. According to the traditional conception of the
international order, however, all states and nations are equal in
dignity, and therefore no nation is in a position to punish another
nation.
The practical consequences of classifying a conflict as war
rather than as crime are many. Those who fight according to the
rules of the Hague Conventions' 9 are entitled to be treated as POWs.
This means that (1) the scope of permissible interrogation is limited
to the POW's identity, (2) his POW status gives him immunity from
prosecution and punishment for having engaged in military
hostilities, and (3) he is entitled to be exchanged and sent home at
the end of hostilities. 20 These privileges of belligerents stem from the
basic idea that entering armed conflict-or, in the older idiom,
engaging in warfare-converts those engaged in the military into
subjects of an alternative legal order.
In the alternative legal order of war, the participants are
entitled to do many things that are strictly prohibited under all
criminal codes. They are allowed to hurt people-indeed, to kill
them-and, less egregiously, to destroy property that is related to the
war effort. The alternative legal order is based on the principle of
reciprocity: those that may act to harm are, to that degree, subject to
a reciprocal risk of harm.
The first principle of the law of war, then, is reciprocity.2'
Although this is obvious to me, I have not found this foundational
19. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, arts.
4-20, annexed to Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter Annex to Hague
Convention II]; Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
arts. 4-20, annexed to Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Annex to Hague
Convention IV].
20. Annex to Hague Convention II, supra note 19; Annex to Hague
Convention IV, supra note 19.
21. See George P. Fletcher, We Must Choose: Justice or War?, Wash. Post,
Oct. 6, 2001, at A29; George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and
Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 Yale L. J. 1499, 1517
(2002) [hereinafter Fletcher, Storrs Lectures] ('The principle of taking prisoners
with the corresponding right of combatants to surrender without being killed lies
at the foundation of the alternative legal order called war.").
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principle discussed in the literature of international law. For the
most part, the principle is taken for granted by those who work in the
field and write legal opinions about the implications of warfare. The
primary argument American military leaders make for observing the
laws of war is that we want our troops to be similarly treated when
they are captured.22
Despite this foundational principle, some cases of non-
international conflict appear to be asymmetrical. One side consists of
combatants fighting according to the laws and customs of war; the
other side consists of irregulars, guerillas, unlawful combatants, and
various categories of fighters who are not entitled to be treated as
privileged combatants under the law of war. This is the third
pathology of the law of war.
Initially, I want to get a grip on the distinction between war
and crime and why the legal orders of war and crime have radically
different implications. Crime is typically the aggression of one person
against another. War is often begun as an act of aggression, as a
violation of jus ad bellum (the right of the nation to go to war), but
once the war begins the two sides are treated as having the same
rights and obligations. They are disfavored under jus in bello (the
duties of soldiers, individually and collectively, when they are
fighting wars) as having been aggressors or privileged as victims of
aggression.
The legal regime passes, then, through three stages. The law
of individual aggression (the wrong of committing a crime) is
transformed by collective action into a violation ofjus ad bellum. The
subtle movement from the initiation of hostilities to the midst of
hostilities represents the passage from the latter tojus in bello.
The reciprocity that matters in warfare is not individual but
collective. When one nation attacks another or intends to attack
under an official declaration, the two nations are at war. The nation
is also at war when hostilities begin without an official declaration of
war.
23
The range of undeclared war now includes internal armed
22. Letter from John Shalikashvili, Retired Gen., et al. to John Warner,
Chairman, Senate Armed Serv's Comm., & Carl Levin, Ranking Member, Senate
Armed Serv's Comm. (Sept. 12, 2006),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06913-etn-military-let-ca3.pdf.
23. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 667-68 (1862).
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conflict. The first great example of this internal conflict is the
American Civil War, which Abraham Lincoln steadfastly refused to
recognize as a conflict between separate nations. The normally-
recognized beginning of the war is South Carolina's shelling of Fort
Sumter in Charleston Harbor. Initially, there was no way of knowing
who was at war with whom. It was not even clear how many states
would try to secede from the Union and of these, how many would go
to war. From the outset, Southerners termed the conflict the War
between the States (eleven states ultimately joined the Confederacy).
The North insisted that the war was an act of rebellion and that in
principle the citizens of southern states were still bound by their
duties of loyalty to the Union.24 But treating the Civil War as an act
of rebellion also had serious legal consequences that the North
rejected. It would have meant that the North could not impose a
blockade that neutral powers were bound, under international law, to
respect.2 And it would have meant, in principle, that all the soldiers
who fought for the Confederacy and fired upon the enemy without
being personally under attack were subject to prosecution for both
treason and murder.26
In the end, neither the Confederate soldiers nor their leaders
were held criminally liable (they were pardoned by the president).27
Yet the South was subject to collective sanctions such as the
cancellation of the Confederate war debt in the Fourteenth
Amendment,28 a measure that had serious consequences for the
Southern economy. The South lost the wealth it had invested in more
than four million slaves and the bondholders who financed the war
effort found themselves with worthless paper. 29 Unsurprisingly, it
took the South about a century to catch up economically with the
24. See George P. Fletcher, Our Secret Constitution: How Lincoln
Redefined American Democracy 41-42 (2001) (explaining that Lincoln viewed the
American people as "an organic national unit" such that "the eleven Southern
states could not go their own way").
25. The Supreme Court rejected this implication. See The Prize Cases, 67
U.S. at 671-74.
26. See Fletcher, supra note 24, at 87-89 (discussing possible trial of
Jefferson Davis for treason after the war).
27. See J.G. Randall & David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction
560-61 (2d ed. 1961).
28. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4.
29. See Branch v. Haas, 16 F. 53, 54 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1883) (declining to
enforce a contract for the sale and delivery of Confederate bonds because the
contract was "connected, by its consideration, with an illegal transaction").
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North.3"
For Americans, the Civil War is the paradigmatic war that
broke down traditional categories of international law. The Civil War
is also critical in American thinking because it is the crucible that
generated the Lieber Code in 1863.3' Drafted by Francis Lieber, a
German immigrant and professor of law at Columbia,3 2 the Lieber
Code was the first systematic code on the law of war.3 3 It is widely
recognized as the first step in the evolution of the international
community toward the Hague Conventions at the end of the century
and the Geneva Conventions in 1949. 34 Lieber regarded the Civil War
as an act of rebellion but one to which the ordinary rules of treating
prisoners properly and exchanging them applied.3"
For Europeans, the conflict that communicates the same
lesson is the 1990s war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Like the Civil War, it
was an internal conflict that was nonetheless treated, in some
respects, as subject to the rules of the Geneva Conventions.36 The
purpose of the Geneva Conventions is to regulate international
armed conflict between the signatories to the treaty, which includes
virtually the entire international community. 37  The Geneva
30. See Gavin Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern
Economy Since the Civil War 240 (1986) (discussing the Civil War's negative
effects on the South's economy).
31. Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the
United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100 (Apr. 24, 1863), available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument [hereinafter Lieber Code].
32. See Theodor Meron, Francis Lieber's Code and Principles of Humanity,
36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 269, 269-70 (1997).
33. See Richard S. Hartigan, Lieber's Code and the Law of War 1-2
(Richard S. Hartigan ed., 1983).
34. See, e.g., Captain Grant R. Doty, The United States and the
Development of the Laws of Warfare, 156 Mil. L. Rev. 224, 241 (1998) ("[Olver
two-thirds of the fifty-six articles in Hague Convention IV can be effectively
traced from the Lieber Code of 1863 .... ").
35. Lieber Code, supra note 31, §§ 153-54.
36. See Norman Cigar & Paul Williams, Indictment at the Hague 43 (2002)
(acknowledging Serbian forces responsible for committing war crimes);
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-01-51-I, Indictment (May 24, 1999),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-iiOll122e.htm
(accusing Slobodan Milosevic of "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and
violations of the "laws or customs" of war).
37. See Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81
Am. J. Int'l L. 348, 348 (1987) (noting the "universal acceptance" of the Geneva
Conventions-even more states are signatories to the Geneva Conventions than
to the U.N. Charter).
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Conventions carried forth the basic principle of international law
that war took place between states. And yet the Geneva Conventions
sowed the textual basis for a radical extension of the concept of war
to include internal conflicts like the Civil War. A special rule called
Common Article Three (common to all of the Geneva Conventions)
applies to non-international or internal conflicts that take place on
the territory of one of the signatories to the treaty.38 In a series of
developments, culminating in the 1995 Tadic decision in the
International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia,3 9  European
jurisprudence came to think of asymmetric internal wars as
equivalent to symmetric international wars.4 °
A second form of asymmetry arose in the law governing the
use of deadly force. The general problem is the armed response of the
state to deadly attacks short of obvious military attacks by organized
armies. Good examples are the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001 in the United States, on March 11, 2004 in
Madrid, on July 7, 2005 in London, and hundreds of times in the last
five years in Israel.
These are precisely the kinds of attacks that we have
difficulty classifying as war or crime. If they are acts of war, then the
defending force can respond under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
against all military targets and all military personnel of the opposing
side.4' The obvious problem in the case of submilitary attacks is that
we cannot so easily identify the military targets-neither the place
nor the people--of the enemy. This is inherent in the nature of
terrorist attacks.
The danger of applying the principle of reciprocity to terrorist
attacks is illustrated in the case of Israel versus the Palestinians.
Palestinian fighters become entitled to kill all Israeli combatants in
uniform conforming to the laws of war. And in return, who are Israeli
soldiers entitled to kill? Since no one in the Palestinian population is
self-designated as a combatant, the class of possible combatants is
38. First Convention, supra note 3, art. 3; Second Convention, supra note
3, art. 3; Third Convention, supra note 3, art. 3; Fourth Convention, supra note 3,
art. 3.
39. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Oct. 2, 1995).
40. See Sean D. Murphy, Developments in International Criminal Law:
Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 93 Am. J.Int'l L. 57, 69 (1999).
41. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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either a null set or encompasses the entire adult population (and
perhaps some active teenagers). The reductio ad absurdum of this
way of thinking is that the Israeli army becomes empowered to kill
the entire Palestinian population. The fact, then, that some
suspected terrorists are designated as targets for assassination
comes into focus as the lesser evil-a sparing of the entire population
for the sake of killing the few regarded as dangerous.4 2
There are three plausible responses to the extreme view
implied by the principle of reciprocity. One is to insist that all
persons not identified as combatants are civilians and therefore
protected against intentional attacks under the Fourth Geneva
Convention and the definition of war crimes in the Rome Statute.4 3
This would be a leap from the fire backwards into the frying pan and
further-away from the heat altogether. It is coherent and consistent
but not entirely plausible in a world of practical politics. The civilian
population vulnerable to terrorist attacks must be allowed to do
something to protect itself. It would retain the right of self-defense in
the case of imminent attacks but the question is whether it can do
something to defeat the threat of terrorism at its base-before the
attacks reach the point of imminent danger.
The other two responses are forms of compromise between
the concepts of crime and of war. The nature of the compromise is to
modify either the concept of the civilian or the concept of the
combatant. For now I turn to variations on the concept of civilians;
modifications of the notion of combatancy will be discussed in the
next section.
The protected status of civilians was relaxed, in part, in the
First Protocol to the Geneva Convention, adopted in 1977." The
Protocol applies exclusively in cases covered by Article 2 of the
Conventions, essentially international armed conflicts.45 Article 51(3)
contains language critical to the problem of targeted assassinations:
"Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section [i.e.,
42. See, e.g., Daniel Statman, Targeted Killing, 5 Theoretical Inquiries L.
179, 195 (2004).
43. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(1); Rome Statute,
supra note 4, art. 8(2)(b)(i)-(iv).
44. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8,
1977, arts. 4-5, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 8-9 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter
Protocol I].
45. Id. art. 1(3).
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"general protection against dangers arising from military
operations"] unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities."46
The Israeli Supreme Court, led by Justice Aaron Barak,
resolved the problem of targeted assassinations of Palestinians by
applying and interpreting this provision. Justice Barak claims-
without much authority-that although Israel has not ratified the
First Protocol, it binds Israel as customary international law. 47 But
the issue is not whether Israel is bound; it is whether Israel can
justify its policy by invoking Article 51(3) of the Protocol.
The term "direct part in hostilities" is obviously vague and
there is little point to an interpretation of the phrase without a
theoretical grounding for the exception to the general protection
afforded to civilians. There are various starting points for a theory of
this sort. One approach would be based on forfeiture. Those who take
"direct part" do not deserve protection. Another could be based on
self-protection. The forfeiture theory would be a variation of the same
view as applied in the theory of self-defense. The argument is that
attackers forfeit their rights by voluntarily exposing themselves to
the risk of deadly force. But they do not choose or desire to expose
themselves to such risks. They choose and desire to harm someone
else. If they could avoid risk to themselves, they would. The
forfeiture argument bears a ring, therefore, of artificiality. 48
The self-protection theory turns out to be a variation on self-
defense. But self-defense depends on how much imminent risk is
posed to the victim. If the civilian taking direct part in hostilities
creates an imminent risk to either combatants or civilians, those
exposed to the risk could rely on the doctrine of self-defense without
invoking the law of war.49 To make a difference, therefore, the law of
46. Id. art. 51(1).
47. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Government of Israel,
para. 30 [2006], httpJ/elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/O2/690/007/a34/
02007690.a34.pdf.
48. Another problem is that the criterion of self-defense in domestic law is
not a culpable attack but a wrongful attack, which may or may not be culpable. If
the attack is not culpable, it is difficult to impute desire for the consequences to
the attacker. See George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor:
A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 Israel L. Rev. 367 (1973).
49. See generally George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Defending
Humanity: When Force is Just and Why (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 129-
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war must apply to cases below the threshold of imminent risk to
others.
Perhaps the best theory would recognize, in effect, that
civilians will be treated as combatants when they act like
combatants. Justice Barak seems to recognize this guideline when he
argues:
A civilian preparing to commit hostilities might be
considered a person who is taking a direct part in
hostilities, if he is openly bearing arms. When he lays down
his weapon, or when he is not committing hostilities, he
ceases to be a legitimate target for attack. Thus, a person
who merely aids the planning of hostilities, or who sends
others to commit hostilities, is not a legitimate target for
attack. Such indirect aid to hostilities might expose the
civilian to arrest and trial, but it cannot turn him into a
legitimate target for attack.5 °
The reference to bearing arms seems to affirm the proposition
that a civilian will be treated as a combatant when he acts like one.
The only problem with this view is that those who plan and direct the
hostilities also behave like combatants. This is what generals do-
they plan and direct hostilities. It is naive to consider only the tiny
sliver of the armed forces that bears arms on the front line as true
combatants. Under the theory of forfeiture, the generals are also
implicated and exposed. But under the alternative view of self-
protection, the generals are arguably not threatening imminent
harm. Under the domestic law of self-defense, organizers behind the
scenes, such as mafia bosses, are not subject to the use of deadly
force. Yet in terms of controlling and terminating military hostilities,
it makes much more sense to strike at the generals than at the
privates bearing arms.
Justice Barak strikes an obviously arbitrary bargain between
the principle of war and the principle of crime. Those who bear arms
from 9:00 to 5:00 are combatants subject to being killed on the spot.
When they are asleep they are not subject to the same rules; they,
and all their superiors, are at that time criminals subject only to
arrest and prosecution. 1
30, on file with Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (discussing self-defense in
war and the essential elements of making legitimate defense claims).
50. Pub. Comm. Against Torture, at para. 7.
51. Id. at para. 5.
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To this compromise between competing worlds must be added
the assumption that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an
international armed conflict governed by the Geneva Conventions. 2
Suppose a terrorist is on the way to bomb the subway in Paris. The
police detect the bomb in his suitcase. Can they shoot him on the
spot?
The Israeli Supreme Court hedges its position by saying that
if you can arrest without killing, you must.53 As Justice Barak
reasons in one line: "[Sluspects are not to be killed without due
process, or without arrest or trial."54 But the law of war does not lend
itself to a combination with the principles of individual justice.
Belligerents are not suspects, and when they are taken
prisoner they are not arrested.55 They are not subject to trial for
having participated in a hostile military force.56 These are two
entirely different paradigms of legal thought. In the case of crime,
suspects are arrested and put on trial. In the case of war, the enemy
is either killed, or captured and held until the end of hostilities. The
attempt to combine the two paradigms has led, in the United States,
to the use of military tribunals to punish enemy combatants as
though they were criminals,57 and in the case of Israel, to the
legalization of targeted assassinations of suspected terrorists.
This, then, is the first pathology of the law of war. There is no
52. Whether it is or not, I do not think the same assumption can be applied
to countries that have experienced terrorist attacks only in recent years, such as
the United Kingdom, France or Egypt.
53. This draws on the compromise suggested by Kretzmer with regard to
creating a realistic alternative for states like Israel to defend their residents
against internal terrorists attacks without abandoning commitments to
standards of human rights and humanitarian law. See Kretzmer, supra note 10,
at 203.
54. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Government of Israel,
para. 4 [20061, http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/02/690/007/a34/
02007690.a34.pdf.
55. See Lieber Code, supra note 31, art. 49 ("A prisoner of war is a public
enemy armed or attached to the hostile army for active aid, who has fallen into
the hands of the captor, either fighting or wounded, on the field or in the hospital,
by individual surrender or by capitulation.").
56. Id. art. 56 ("A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a
public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction
of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation,
death, or any other barbarity.").
57. See Fletcher, supra note 16, at 455-59.
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theory of the proper spheres of crime and of war. And yet, as we have
seen, enormous legal consequences flow from the attempt to merge
the diverse spheres of law. This strikes me as one of the deepest
problems in the law of war and yet the discussion in the literature
has yet to become theoretically sophisticated.5 8
II. THE PROBLEM OF PROPORTIONALITY
In international law it is assumed that the use of force must
be necessary to attain a military objective and that any collateral
damage to civilians must be proportional to the value of the military
objective. In this respect, the law of war closely follows the law of
self-defense, which imposes similar requirements on the legitimate
use of force.5 9
The language of the Rome Statute uses the term
"proportional" in the rule of self-defense in Article 31.60 But the
vocabulary shifts slightly in the context of determining the
legitimacy of military attacks that endanger civilians' lives.
Endangerment of civilians is disproportionate and unlawful when the
attack is launched with knowledge that the consequences will be
"clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall
military advantage anticipated."6 1
Justice Barak uses both modes of discourse-
disproportionate and excessive-in setting the limits to the use of
targeted assassinations. He states: "The principle of proportionality
is a central principle of the laws of war. It forbids striking even
58. The best I have seen is Kretzmer but he proposes a mixture of
paradigms without delving seriously into the question of how much war and how
much law enforcement would represent the ideal combination of the two spheres
of law. See Kretzmer, supra note 10, at 174.
59. See George P. Fletcher, Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the
Law on Trial 41 (1988); see also Kretzmer, supra note 10 at 177-78 (noting that
international human rights law prefers deterrence and prevention to be achieved
through the use of criminal processes, and that the use of force is only legitimate
in a narrow set of circumstances).
60. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 31(1) ("a person shall not be criminally
responsible if at the time of that person's conduct: ... The person acts reasonably
to defend himself or herself.., in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger
to the person. .. ").
61. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iv) (using the same language cited by Justice Barak and
found in Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions); Protocol I, supra note 44, art.
51(5)(B).
2007]
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [38:517
legitimate targets, if the attack is likely to lead to injury of innocent
persons which is excessive, considering the military benefit
stemming from the act."62
Despite the assumption that legality presupposes
proportionality, some nuanced distinctions are called for to
understand the intuitions underlying the law of war. The first major
distinction is between the defense of the nation as a whole and the
seeking of a particular military objective. If the purpose of defensive
force is to thwart an attack that threatens the nation as a whole, I
am not sure that the principle of proportionality actually limits the
use of defensive force. The Kantian model of vindicating autonomy
63
applies with full vigor to cases of nations fighting for their survival.M
If there is no option but to use nuclear weapons to defeat an enemy
invasion, then even this extreme measure might be justified. 65 But if
the use of force is a post-attack effort to prevent subsequent attacks,
the question of proportionality does arise. For instance, if a single
Egyptian bomber reaches Tel Aviv and inflicts a hundred civilian
deaths, Israel would undoubtedly respond. But launching a nuclear
strike against Cairo would be a disproportionate response. The issue
of proportionality becomes acute in these cases because the normal
requirement of necessity does little work.
But Justice Barak is not concerned with the case of national
survival; he is concerned with the case of securing of particular
objectives, in which the international documents prohibit the use of
force that is "excessive, considering the military benefit stemming
from the act."66
The principle of proportionality is not itself a pathology of the
law of war. The problem arises from the many different senses in
which the concept is used. There are in fact four distinct sorts of
proportionality. I go through each to raise international lawyers'
awareness of the shift from stricter to looser standards.
62. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Government of Israel,
para. 8 [2006], http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/02/690/007/a34
02007690.a34.pdf.
63. Kant, supra note 18, §§ 43-49.
64. See Fletcher, supra note 48, at 379-80.
65. Cf Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (Jul. 8) (suggesting that the use of nuclear weapons
might be lawful when the surival of a nation would be at stake).
66. Pub. Comm. Against Torture, at para. 8.
532
THE LAW OF WAR
The strictest standard arises in cases of self-defense. It is
possible to think of self-defense without recognizing any limitation
based on the interests of the aggressor. Indeed that is a respectable
position in Kantian legal theory.67 When the interests of the victim do
become relevant, they impose a limit on the use of deadly force for
the sake of protecting minor interests. The classic case in German
law is whether it should be permissible to kill an apple thief when
there is no other way of preventing the theft.68
If "disproportionate force" limits the right of self-defense it is
because taking human life represents excessive harm relative to the
advantage of securing petty interests in property. This limited
exception to self-defense is represented making the point 90 on a
scale of 1 to 100.
Disproportionate
I I I I I I I I I I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Fig. 2.2 - Disproportionate self-defense.
In cases of justifiable necessity we may also speak of
disproportionate force, but the meaning is entirely different. In the
language of the Model Penal Code, the person using force may act
only if the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense charged. 69 Here the pursuit of the greater good provides the
primary rationale for the action. Thus if the disproportionate force in
self-defense is represented by the figure 10, the disproportionate
force in cases of necessity would be signaled by the ratio of 51 to 49.
67. See Fletcher, supra note 48, at 379.
68. Reichsgericht [RG] [Supreme Court 1880-1945] Sept 20, 1920, 55
Enstscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen [RGSt] 82 (F.R.G.).
69. Model Penal Code § 3.02(1)(a) (2001).
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Fig. 2.3 - Disproportionate justifiable necessity.
These two standards are often confused in the law of war,
and in particular, in the cases contemplated by Justice Barak. When
we assess the liability of commanders who send in bombers to attack
military targets and cause collateral damage to nearby civilians, the
governing principle is the doctrine of double effect borrowed from
Catholic theology. The doctrine holds that if the primary purpose of
the action is legitimate (say the pursuit of a military target), then
collateral damage is acceptable provided that the damage is not
disproportionate to the aim pursued. The underlying moral principle
is that the action should be regarded as privileged because of the
legitimacy of the dominant purpose. Disproportional side effects
provide a veto as they do in cases of self-defense. The kind of
proportionality at stake here, therefore, is not of the sort that applies
in cases of necessity as a justification where the ends and the means
are of equal moral value. The case of "excessive side effects" in the
law of war is closer to the one-side graph for self-defense than the
equipoise suggested by the principle of lesser evils in the criminal
law.
As if this situation was not sufficiently complicated, German
private law also distinguishes between defensive and aggressive
necessity against property interests. Defensive necessity arises when
the defender must face a threat bearing down on him by a non-
human actor.7 ° The classic example would be shooting a rabid dog in
order to protect children in the area. The principles of self-defense
apply against human actors who engage in aggression, but not
against dogs, which are considered property and are not subject to
the norms of the legal system. An interesting feature of passive
70. Buirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGBI [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896,
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGB1] 234, § 228.
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necessity as applied in the case of shooting the attacking dog"' is
that, as in cases of self-defense, the defender is not required to pay
compensation to the owner of the dog (or the victim in cases of self-
defense). 2
Conversely, in cases of aggressive necessity the aggressor is
intruding upon the property of another in order to save a higher
interest. This is typified by a famous American tort case: a shipowner
moors his ship to a dock owned by another in order to avoid the
devastating impact of an impending storm.73 The storm crashes the
ship into the dock, causing minor damage. In this case, both under
German and American law, the shipowner is justified in mooring his
ship, but he must compensate the affected party for the loss. 74 This
standard of necessity differs from that of passive necessity. In both
cases the principle of proportionality imposes a limit. In the case of
defensive necessity, the standard lies between the case of necessity
as a justification in criminal law and the case of self-defense. It
should be represented as point 70 on the graph.
IDisproportionate
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Fig. 2.4 - Disproportionate passive necessity.
71. Reichsgericht [RG] [Supreme Court 1880-1945] June 17, 1901, 34
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen [RGSt] 295 (297) (F.R.G.).
72. BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug, 18, 1896,
Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 234, § 228. There is an exception for cases in which the
defender brings about the attack, say, by letting the dog out of confinement. Id. at
sentence 2.
73. Vincent v. Lake Erie Trans. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
74. See id. at 222.
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [38:517
In the case of aggressive necessity, the standard of
proportionality is more demanding. It cuts off the permissibility of
the action at a stage even earlier than the 50/50 line. It should be
represented as point 30 on the graph. That is, if you intrude upon
another person's property and damage it, you need to have a very
good reason. In cost/benefit terms, the standard for passive necessity
(shooting the attacking dog) is that the costs cannot be too great
relative to the benefits. But in the cases of aggressive necessity, in
which the actor intrudes upon the property of another and causes
harm, the benefit must actually be much greater than the costs. For
instance, the benefit must be saving life relative to the cost of doing
damage to property interests. This makes sense because an intrusion
against someone else's property rights is always questionable and
subject to tight restraints.
Disproportionate
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Fig. 2.5 - Disproportionate aggressive necessity.
These differences reflect two value commitments. First, we
should maintain a high respect for private property, even though we
have less respect for property if it is a source of risk to others (i.e. the
rabies-stricken dog). If the aggressor selects the victim and
deliberately invades the property of another (as in choosing to dock
without permission in order to protect the ship), the invasion against
the rights of another is more palpable.7 5 Second, passive victims of
threats have greater rights than those whose bodies become the
instruments of harm. If a fetus growing inside the mother's womb
threatens her life, the principle of defensive necessity would apply to
75. See id.
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justify abortion of the fetus provided, of course, that the death of the
fetus is regarded as being within the realm of proportionality.76 In
this scenario, it is of critical relevance that the fetus moving in the
mother's domain is described as a threat. If the fetus were in its own
domain, apart from the mother, it would be much more difficult to
justify killing the fetus in order to generate a benefit, even a life-
saving one, for another person."
If a thing is tainted because it generates a risk to others, it is
generally of lesser value in the balancing process, and this lesser
value is reflected by the fact that it is possible to apply defensive
necessity (as opposed to necessity as the lesser of two evils or
aggressive necessity). That being the case, a serious problem
remains: why, as a matter of principle, should an object's being the
source of a risk matter in a modern rational system of criminal law?
The literature in this area has not yet generated a convincing
answer.
While the distinction between aggressive and passive
necessity is not recognized in Anglo-American criminal law or
international criminal law, it remains a valid option that needs to be
considered in defining the concept of proportionality in the law of
war.
In order of declining severity, the four standards are: (1) self-
defense, (2) passive necessity, (3) lesser evils, and (4) aggressive
necessity. In my view, the standard of proportionality that matters in
the law of war falls someplace between self-defense and passive
necessity. But this is very imprecise. The entire matter requires
deeper theoretical consideration. In the meantime we are exposed to
the constant manipulation by critics and proponents who use the
concept of proportionality as they see fit. The pathology is the
ambiguity, and the failure to think about it.
76. See Reichsgericht [RG] [Supreme Court 1880-1945] Mar. 11, 1927, 61
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen [RGSt] 242 (254-256) (F.R.G.)
(reasoning that, because the rights of a fetus must be balanced against the rights
of a mother, abortion is not unlawful so long as it is the only means of saving the
mother from a current threat of death or serious bodily harm.).
77. For a difficult and wrenching case, see the problem of the conjoined
twins in Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation), [20001 3 F.C.R.
577 (C.A.). The court decided in favor of separating the twins in order to save the
one who had the substantially better chance of survival.
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III. WAR CRIMES
One of the mysteries in the relationship of war and crime is
the way in which war crimes break the collective spell of military
action. We can make sense of the claim that in the course of
hostilities the individual soldier merges with the collective military
unit.78 But is it possible, then, that the individual reemerges from the
collective and becomes individually liable for a war crime? If he kills
a soldier, he is part of the collective; if he intentionally kills a
civilian, he is on his own-but not entirely on his own. The Rome
Statute recognizes jurisdiction over war crimes "in particular when
committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale
commission of such crimes."7 9 The force of this qualification, in
particular, is not clear. Crimes are not usually defined like this. It
would be like defining murder as the killing of a human being and in
particular, the killing of someone who is weak and innocent. There
may be some factors that influence prosecutorial discretion, but they
do not form part of the definition of the offense. In this case, however,
the collective dimension of "a part of a plan or policy" appears central
to the definition of the crime. It is parallel to the collective definition
specified in the definition of crimes against humanity: the specified
acts must be "part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against [a] civilian population."8 °
The collective and individual dimensions of war crimes, then,
interweave in the following ways. Military hostilities are collective by
definition: nations and similarly constituted groups go to war, not
individuals. Some subgroups engage in a collective crime based on a
shared plan or policy or widespread commission of the offenses. The
latter collective effort provides the basis for individual responsibility
under the Rome Statute."1
78. This idea is often associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau. See Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in The Essential Rousseau 13-14 (Lowell
Bair trans., 1974) (1762).
79. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(1).
80. Id. art. 7(1). There is also an implicit requirement in the history of
genocide that the crime be committed by one nation against another. See
Fletcher, Storrs Lectures, supra note 21, at 1514.
81. This does not account for the precise conceptual relationship between
the collective action and individual responsibility. For example, must the actor
know of the collective plan or policy? This is not clear. In contrast, the Rome
Statute provides that in committing a crime against humanity the actor must
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The concept of war crimes still bears the mystery, then, of
interrelating the conceptual dimension of both warfare and military
criminality and the individual nature of criminal liability and
punishment. To get a grip on this subtle concept-one I believe is
totally ignored in the literature of international criminal law-we
should review the emergence of war crimes as a concept in American
constitutional history.
In the history of the concept in American law, we encounter
precisely the danger highlighted by the merger of crime and war in
Justice Barak's analysis of targeted assassinations. A hybrid between
war and crime emerges and this hybrid enables military commissions
to impose punishment on those who would otherwise be treated as
soldiers exempt from criminal liability.
To understand how this happened, we need to focus for a
moment on the first two cases in American history that employ the
concept of war crimes. They are both cases of ongoing relevance in
the current debate about the legitimacy of military commissions. The
first is the colorful case of Ex Parte Quirin, in which eight German
saboteurs landed off Long Island and Florida in June 1942, buried
their uniforms and their explosives on the beach, and then headed
inland to reconnoiter their potential targets.8 2 They did not get far
before two got cold feet and called the FBI to turn themselves in. All
eight were arrested within days, and President Roosevelt
immediately issued an executive order establishing a military
tribunal. 3
The subsequent proceedings have had an enormous impact
on the law related to military tribunals. The first critical step was
that the Supreme Court agreed to hear claims of habeas corpus while
the military commission proceeding was pending. 4 After the
Supreme Court's per curiam order, the military commission quickly
issued its verdict. Six of the defendants were electrocuted within
days. 5 It was objectionable for Chief Justice Stone to take another
four months to write an opinion for the Court-imagine a version of
know of the systematic or widespread attack directed against a civilian
population. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7.
82. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 1 (1942).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 19.
85. See A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 Wis.
L. Rev. 309, 323 (2003).
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Bush v. Gore8 6 in which the Court says, George W. Bush wins the
presidential election and in a few months we will tell you why.
Nonetheless, on its own terms, the opinion expresses many
important concerns about the law of war. The four prominent issues
in Quirin are: (1) Why are the eight defendants not entitled to
immunity as POWs?; (2) What crime did they commit by entering the
United States surreptitiously?; (3) Why are they not entitled to a jury
trial?; and (4) Why are the procedural deviations between military
commissions and courts martial acceptable under federal law?
All four of these issues are of critical relevance and continue
to influence litigation about military commissions, and did so
recently in the June 2006 case Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.87 For my
purpose, the biggest problem in Quirin is explaining why the German
soldiers are not entitled to POW immunity. They are not even
entitled (as they would be in cases of doubt about their status under
the Geneva Conventions) to be presumed to be POWs until a
competent tribunal determines otherwise. The solution to this
problem, according to Chief Justice Stone's opinion, lies in the
invention of the category of unlawful combatant. These are the
critical lines:
By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws
a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful
populations of belligerent nations and also between those
who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful
combatants are subject to capture and detention as
prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful
combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention,
but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by
military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency
unlawful.
88
Here we encounter the first breach in the principle of POW
immunity. The German soldiers have no immunity if they are
unlawful combatants. And how do they become unlawful
combatants? Well, by not qualifying as combatants under the
definition in Article One of the Annex to the Hague Conventions. 9
The four conditions laid out in the Annex to the Hague Conventions
and then repeated in the Geneva Conventions are these:
86. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
87. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
88. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942).
89. Annex to Hague Convention IV, supra note 19, art. 1.
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The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to
armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the
following conditions:
To be commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a
distance;
To carry arms openly; and
To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
The heading for the provision is the "Qualifications of
Belligerents."91 Everyone in the regular army should be of this
qualification upon capture, but the Court interpreted these four
conditions for all troops, not just those in the militia and volunteer
corps.92 This is the reason that the saboteurs did not qualify as
belligerents. In this limited sense they were unlawful combatants.
There is no suggestion in the Hague Conventions that failing to
qualify as a belligerent would imply criminal liability.
In one of the greatest legal fallacies I have ever encountered,
the Quirin court makes the giant leap from the status of failing to
qualify as a lawful combatant to the crime of being an unlawful
combatant. This is like reasoning from someone's driving a Chevrolet
without a license to the liability of General Motors for a violation of
the criminal law. Essentially, the Quirin defendants were engaged in
practicing war without a license. They had bad intentions but they
had done only one thing that could qualify as a crime in federal court:
engaging in a conspiracy to commit espionage and sabotage. There
was little doubt on this point; in fact, the military charged them with
conspiracy to commit these offenses along with the alleged violation
of the law of war.93
Amazingly, the Quirin court ignored the charge of conspiracy
and affirmed the conviction solely on the possibility of violating the
law of war.94 That the Quirin court ignored the charge of conspiracy
became a critical factor in the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan,
in which the Court held that conspiracy charges are not subject to
90. Id.; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(2).
91. Annex to Hague Convention IV, supra note 19, ch. 1.
92. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
93. Id. at 23.
94. Id. at 48.
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prosecution in military tribunals.95 Be that as it may, and I am
grateful that Hamdan came out as it did, there are at least three
good reasons for distancing ourselves from the concept of unlawful
belligerency as introduced in Quirin.
First, Quirin confuses the failure to qualify for a status with
the commission of a harmful act. Second, the Department of Defense
realized that something was illogical about the concept of unlawful
combatancy as a crime. When the Department defined the offenses
that might be charged in military tribunals in what it called Military
Commission Instruction No. 2, it specifically omitted the offense of
merely being an unlawful combatant (or in their preferable language,
the crime of being an unprivileged belligerent).96 Instruction No. 2
defines an offense of murder 97 and destruction of property by an
unprivileged belligerent.98 The Military Commissions Act omits even
these offenses. 99 Unlawful belligerency is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite of the military tribunals.'00
The third reason for rejecting the logic of Quirin is that the
offense is not the kind of crime that would be properly recognized
under international criminal law applicable to all nations. The illegal
entry into the United States bothered President Roosevelt
(understandably, for symbolic reasons), but it certainly would not
offend the sensibilities of other countries or the international
community as a whole.'0 ' One would not expect a rational German
court to convict the eight saboteurs. On the contrary, their
compatriots would be proud of them. The offense was a parochial
offense in much the way espionage and treason are: those who spy or
commit treason against the United States naturally subject
themselves to liability in American court but they are not guilty of an
international crime.
95. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2785 (2006).
96. Dept. of Defense, Military Comm'n Instruction No. 2: Crimes and
Elements for Trials by Military Comm'n, 6(B)(3),6(B)(4) (Apr. 30, 2003)
[hereinafter Military Comm'n Instruction No. 2], available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2003/d20030430milcominstno2.pdf.
97. Id. at 6(B)(3).
98. Id. at 6(B)(4).
99. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.A. § 948(d) (West 2007).
But see id.§ 950(v)(b)(1)-(16) (defining murder and destruction of property as
triable crimes).
100. Military Comm'n Instruction No. 2, supra note 96, at 6(B).
101. See George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the
Proposed Military Tribunals, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 635, 650 (2002).
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In contrast to Quirin, consider the second major case on war
crimes in the Supreme Court, the prosecution of Japanese General
Yamashita in a military tribunal for failing to properly supervise his
rampaging troops in the Philippines. '°2 He was recognized to be a
POW but nonetheless subject to prosecution. He was convicted of an
essentially new crime based on the same provision of the Hague
Convention that defined the elements for qualifying as a belligerent.
The third element is that the belligerent must be commanded by a
person responsible for his subordinates. The Court took the word
"responsible" as a cue that criminal responsibility would be
appropriate for a commander who negligently failed to control his
subordinates. 0 3 This, of course, is a major stretch-a clear violation
of the principle nulla poena sine lege, the rule of prior legislative
warning. If a similar stretch occurred in a domestic criminal
prosecution we would scream bloody due process. And yet, Yamashita
has become a precedent that has shaped international criminal
liability. It is the foundation for the concept of command
responsibility in the ad hoc tribunals and Article 28 of the Rome
Statute. °4 Yamashita deserves to be called the first American case to
establish a universal principle of international criminal
wrongdoing.'
05
But the idea of cracking POW immunity originates in
Quirin.'0 6 Quirin played a positive critical role in Hamdan 0 7 but
Chief Justice Stone's opinion also introduced another concept that
has contributed to the unraveling of the protections for POWs
originally promised by the Hague and Geneva Conventions: the
concept of enemy combatant. The context is the same as the
102. In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
103. This report of the decision is a bit generous. In fact, the Court does not
use the word negligence but merely refers to an unlawful failure to prevent
atrocities. See id. 327 U.S. at 14-16 (noting that the Hague Conventions place "an
affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate
in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.").
104. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 28. See Major Michael L. Smidt,
Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary
Military Operations, 164 Mil. L. Rev. 155, 200-01 (2000).
105. See Fletcher, supra note 101, 650-51; Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures,
supra note 21, at 1516 n.77.
106. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
107. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2771-72 (2006) (citing Quirin
as precedent for direct judicial review of challenges to the validity of military
commissions proceedings in order to protect civil liberties).
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previously cited language about unlawful combatants. Chief Justice
Stone thought of enemy combatants as fighters who did not warrant
POW status and who could be punished for their hostile and harmful
actions. 10 8 In Yamashita, a majority opinion also written by Chief
Justice Stone, the term is used at least ten times and seemingly
interchangeably with the term "prisoner of war."'
0 9
As the language of war has evolved, however, the concept of
enemy combatant has become a major pathology of the law of war. By
2004, when litigation over the detainees in Guant~inamo Bay finally
reached the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the assumption of
the Court was that the government could detain enemy combatants
until the end of hostilities-even if that meant the duration of their
lives."0 The only real debate was whether the President could
designate somebody as an enemy combatant or whether a decision of
a neutral tribunal was necessary to classify someone as subject to
detention without a criminal conviction. In the authoritative
plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor, there is no discussion whether
Hamdi was entitled to POW status."' The only relevant category was
one not even mentioned in the Hague or Geneva Conventions, the
American invention called enemy combatancy.
Originally, at least, in the Quirin opinion, the Court took
seriously the question whether a detainee was entitled to treatment
as a POW. Now the detainees are fortunate to get a hearing by a
supposedly neutral Combat Status Review Tribunal to decide
whether they were fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan as
opposed to just being an aide worker caught on the spot. 12 The new
Military Commissions Act of 2006 treats POW status as irrelevant.'3
It distinguishes, as did the Court in Hamdan, between lawful and
unlawful enemy combatants. The latter are to be tried in military
commissions. The former do not receive immunity as POWs but
108. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
109. In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 4-26 (1946).
110. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
111. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-24.
112. See Dep't of Def., Directive 2310.01E, The Department of Defense
Detainee Program 3 (2006); see also Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy
Secretary of Defense, on Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal
Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba (July 14, 2006) (explaining the structure, authority, and procedures
associated with the Combatant Status Review Tribunal).
113. Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 947-950 (West 2007).
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rather are subject, illogically, to prosecution in courts martial for a
range of offenses, including many that are not violations of the law of
war.
114
The worst thing about this unraveling of POW immunity is
that now enemy combatants have the worst of both worlds. They are
subject to being held indefinitely like POWs, but unlike POWs they
are subject to being prosecuted for engaging in hostilities against the
United States.
The experience of Salim Ahmad Hamdan is illustrative. He
was Osama bin Laden's driver for five years before he was picked up
in Afghanistan." 5 There is no evidence, so far as I know, that he was
bearing arms for the Taliban. 1 6 But he was a true believer in the
goals of al Qaeda, and although he presumably did no more than
drive bin Laden from place to place, a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal labeled him an enemy combatant."17 After two years of
detention in Guantdnamo Bay, the Government decided to prosecute
him in a military commission. They charged him with having joined a
conspiracy to engage in terrorist acts against civilians, namely the
September 11, 2001, attacks." 8 After a surprising victory in the
district court 19 and then a reversal in the D.C. circuit,12 0 he quite
astoundingly garnered five votes in the Supreme Court.
There is some basis in Justice Breyer's concurring opinion for
thinking that the problem with military commissions is that the
President acted on his own. Under this interpretation, the problem is
114. Id. § 948(c). There is no reason, in my opinion, to assume that this
provision is constitutional.
115. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
116. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1362 or, in
the Alternative, Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5-6, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.
Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 04-1519), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/documents/Swift 000.pdf. But see
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2834 n.10 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that
Hamdan was charged with receiving weapons training at an al Qaeda camp);
Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 66a, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (No.
05-184), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/documents/hamdan.certapp3.pdf
(alleging that Hamdan delivered weapons to al Qaeda members and picked up
weapons at Taliban warehouses for al Qaeda use).
117. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2761 (2006).
118. Id.at 2759.
119. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004).
120. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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remedied because Congress has enacted the Military Commissions
Act and reinstituted charges of conspiracy in the jurisdiction of
military tribunals. 12' Whether it truly is remedied will depend on
how Hamdan is read in the next round of litigation. My preferred
reading is that the four-vote plurality under Justice Stevens (with
possible adherence by Justices Kennedy and Roberts) interpreted the
law of war to be of constitutional status.
The argument for the constitutional interpretation of
Hamdan goes like this: in the tradition from Milligan 2 2 to Quirin,
the defendant plausibly objected to trial in a military commission on
Sixth Amendment grounds.1 23 Since the proceedings were criminal in
nature, he was entitled to a jury trial. But the response was that the
law of military commissions antedated the Constitution and
therefore took precedence over the guarantee of a jury trial. If that is
so, then the law of war as applied in the tribunals is incorporated
into the constitutional structure. It cannot be redefined by a simple
law of Congress.
Somehow I fear this argument will not succeed. The law of
war is too pathological to do us this service of protecting civil liberties
against a Congress bent on favoring the power of the president and
the military. The pathologies began with the breakdown of the
distinction between war and crime and they continue with erosion of
the fundamental immunity granted to belligerents under the Hague
and Geneva Conventions.
121. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.A. § 950(v)(28) (West
2007); see also Fletcher, supra note 16.
122. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
123. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
